Dell, HP, IBM, Sun and Fujitsu/FSC are in the Leaders quadrant, and we see all those vendors as "safe" choices for using servers worldwide. However, the vendors in the Visionaries and Niche Players quadrants continue to provide completely viable choices for targeted applications. Gartner's Magic Quadrant for Worldwide Server Vendors should not be the sole basis for server selection. Organizations should also leverage the Server Evaluation Model (SEM), Gartner's other published research and inquiry sessions with Gartner analysts.

The worldwide server market is valued at more than $54 billion, which includes a variety of operating systems and processor technologies. High-volume technologies, such as Windows and Linux on x86 servers, are undergoing growth, while traditional RISC Unix servers are struggling to grow market share. The ever-present mainframe continues to thrive, while sales of other platforms of similar age are fading. Many vendors in this market hedge their bets by investing in growth platforms to offset declining platforms or attempt to shift the market dynamics by introducing new technology, such as blade servers. Some vendors have chosen to invest in a single platform architecture — typically x86 — or to focus on a specific workload or market segment.

This Magic Quadrant covers the worldwide server market. Any vendor that is selling server hardware platforms is a candidate for inclusion in this Magic Quadrant. This includes general-purpose server vendors and established specialist server vendors. The specialist vendors often only address certain workload requirements (such as data warehousing or high-performance computing) or address limited geographies. This Magic Quadrant focuses only on vendors, as we do not address specific product lines. Thus, vendors with multiple product lines — such as Fujitsu, HP, IBM and Sun — appear only once in the Magic Quadrant. Some Fujitsu strategies (such as FSC) are specific to their Fujitsu-Siemens jointly owned operation in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA); we have drawn attention to this where appropriate.

We are not addressing vendors that have less than $10 million annual revenue from platform sales. Thus, we have excluded immature startup vendors from this Magic Quadrant.

This is the first Magic Quadrant for Worldwide Server Vendors.

Not applicable

The standard Gartner Magic Quadrant includes seven criteria for the Ability to Execute axis. We are using all seven criteria in the worldwide server Magic Quadrant and assigned a weight to each criterion. These weights are a factor in determining the final placement of vendors in this Magic Quadrant.

The standard Gartner Magic Quadrant includes eight criteria for the Completeness of Vision axis. We are using all eight criteria in the worldwide server Magic Quadrant, and have applied a weight to each criterion. These weights are a factor in determining the final placement of vendors in this Magic Quadrant.

Leaders are able to transform their vision and ability to execute into strong sales over a broad market base. Leaders execute well in many geographical markets and tend to be market share leaders in one or more of their product lines. The leaders may not always be first in offering leading-edge technologies, but they are adept at detecting technology trends and turning them into mainstream products of broad interest to the server market.

There are no challengers in the Magic Quadrant for Worldwide Server Vendors, 4Q07.

Vendors in the Visionaries quadrant tend to have strong product offerings in one or more product segments, but tend to be limited in their ability to execute. They often offer best-of-breed technology in a given product segment, but lack the resources to market and sell their products effectively worldwide. Visionary vendors should not be dismissed because of their placement in this Magic Quadrant; they may offer the best product for a specific workload in a specific product segment.

The significant characteristic of the niche players is that they address a limited market or vertical segment. As in the case of visionary vendors, niche player vendors often offer products and services specifically tuned to a market segment or vertical industry. This may result in a relatively small installed base or market penetration, but that does not mean the vendor or the products lack viability. However, investment in these vendors will incur more risk than selecting a vendor from the other quadrants.

• Apple's XServe represents well-designed and competitively priced x86 offerings.
• Apple's Mac OS X for XServe is Unix-based and offers strong interoperability with Windows.

• Apple's primary appeal is in enterprises housing Apple Mac computers.
• Apple has limited sales and marketing efforts directed to enterprise customers.
• Apple's most recent priority products, such as the iPhone and iPod Touch, have placed its servers at a lower priority in terms of resource commitment and focus.

• After many years of decline, Bull is experiencing a resurgence due to improved morale and client confidence.
• Didier Lamouche, who took over as CEO after the death of Pierre Bonelli in April 2004, has executed many of the strategies that Bonelli put in place, but also has had the courage to make pragmatic decisions that have steadily brought the company back to a sound financial footing.
• The NovaScale server line is technically innovative and is helping Bull penetrate new markets, such as high-performance computing. Bull has also entered new geographic markets through OEM deals.

• Bull's business is still heavily entrenched in a small number of geographies (mainly France and western Europe) and vertical markets.
• Bull's traditional OEM relationship with NEC has become less strategic for both vendors.
• Market success for high-end NovaScale platforms is dependent on market acceptance for Windows or Linux on Itanium.

• Dell continues to offer high-quality x86 servers at competitive pricing.
• Dell's direct market approach appeals to many enterprises.
• Gartner's surveys show Dell is the preferred partner in small and midsize businesses (SMBs).
• Dell has successfully leveraged its PC sales to garner server sales.
• Dell's server platform management strategy is aided by adoption of third-party offerings.

• Dell is focused exclusively on 1-socket to 4-socket x86 servers.
• Dell's second-generation blade offering has not been competitive. (A more-competitive third-generation product likely will be available in 2008.)
• Dell’s sales, support and service capabilities are not consistent worldwide.
• Dell is still developing its software, service and solutions strategies.

• Egenera has a technologically leading blade solution (hardware and software).
• Egenera has an excellent track record of moving customers from legacy systems to blades.
• The OEM agreement with Fujitsu-Siemens has aided business in EMEA.

• Egenera's hardware offering is limited to its blade-based architecture.
• Competing vendors are narrowing the gap on Egenera's technology lead.
• The vertical industry focus limits Egenera's ability to project BladeFrame as a general-purpose platform.

• Fujitsu/FSC offers comprehensive and complementary families of x86, RISC and Itanium server platforms, with a heavy "Green IT" focus.
• A highly innovative FlexFrame strategy helps Fujitsu/FSC gain momentum through strong Oracle and SAP relationships.
• The company is committed to engineering quality and offering strong services.
• Its platform management strategy is aided by the extension of PAN Manager across server product lines.

• Fujitsu/FSC and Sun have mixed messages regarding a strategic role and future for SPARC Enterprise Server technology.
• There is a corporate governance structure and fragmented go-to-market strategy for product portfolio delivery to the installed base across Fujitsu organizations and geographies.
• Market success for high-end PrimeQuest platforms is dependent on market acceptance for Windows or Linux on Itanium.
• Dual blade strategy (Fujitsu/FSC and Egenera) creates some hardware confusion in market.
• The future of the Fujitsu-Siemens (FSC) jointly owned company needs clarifying because the 10-year collaborative agreement expires in 2009.

• Gateway offers a competitive line of x86 servers.
• Gateway's local support and service for its servers appeal to many types of customers.

• Management support for Gateway's server business has been uneven.
• Although Gateway has been acquired by Acer, its server business has been re-sold to MPC.
• The long-term marketing plans for Gateway's server products are not yet known.

• HP has a strong and loyal customer base.
• HP has strong software, system management, service and solution strategies.
• The latest BladeSystem generation has enabled HP to benefit from growing market enthusiasm for "green computing."
• HP's channel development strategy is proven and strongly executed.
• HP has shown good ability to identity and assist customers moving from midrange platforms to x86 platforms.

• HP must continue to invest time and energy to reverse negative market perceptions of Itanium.
• The Unix market as a whole is stagnant, and HP must fiercely fight for its share of that market.
• New business opportunities for legacy platforms (OpenVMS and NonStop) are limited.
• HP's blade strategy can have a polarizing effect on potential buyers.

• IBM has a strong and loyal customer base.
• IBM has strong software, service and solution strategies.
• IBM has enjoyed reinvigorated interest in mainframe deployments.
• Growing market confidence in IBM's Unix strategy should be sustained, based on early indications of acceptance of its new Power 6 generation.
• IBM's mainframe, BladeCenter, and virtualization have enabled IBM to benefit from growing market enthusiasm for green computing.

• IBM struggles to position all its platforms in a cohesive story to potential buyers.
• IBM has shown limited concern for moving interested customers between its platforms.
• The Unix market as a whole is stagnant, and IBM must fiercely fight for its share of that market when converging System p and System i servers.
• IBM's blade strategy can have a polarizing effect on potential buyers.

• Netezza's well-engineered node-based design offers significant scaling potential for high-end data warehouse deployments.
• Although technically still a startup, Netezza is well-funded and well-managed. It is respected for its application knowledge.

• The installed base of live production users is limited. Ensure that Netezza has proven examples of implementations in your region or vertical industry.
• By basing its technology on Linux, Netezza has (correctly) anticipated that the market for Linux-based data warehousing will grow. However, market acceptance is at a relatively early stage.

• NEC offers an innovative and well-engineered line of x86 and Itanium servers (fault-tolerant line through an OEM collaboration with Stratus).
• NEC's growing collaboration with Unisys should create better awareness in western markets.

• Given the size and stature of the company, NEC has limited market awareness in most geographies other than Japan.
• NEC's marketing and positioning have been bland. NEC struggles to prove real differentiation from its peers.

• Rackable Systems has a strong position in Internet-facing and large-scale data center environments.
• Rackable's approach can be an appealing alternative to high-density blade deployments.
• Rackable's container-based solution offers dramatic savings in power and cooling costs.

• It is difficult for Rackable to translate its appeal to small and medium-scale data centers.
• Rackable's customer base is not a broad representation of all data centers in all geographies.
• Container-based computing is a new concept in the market.

• SGI's fabric-based computing strategy is proven and mature in key high-performance computing applications.
• The new Altix ICE Blade platform is suited to a variety of workload requirements.

• Acceptance of fabric computing outside of high-performance computing markets is nascent.
• SGI is increasingly leveraging Intel x86 and standard Linux distributions, making it appropriate for deploying mainstream commercial solutions; but market confidence in SGI for supplying this type of usage remains relatively low.

• Stratus Technologies offers the highest-availability x86 servers on the market.
• Stratus' service and support for its servers has an outstanding record.
• The OEM relationship with NEC gives Stratus access to additional markets.

• Improvements in x86 availability and failover clustering software compete directly with Stratus technology.
• Market confidence in Windows or Linux as fault-tolerant platform choices has been slow to grow.
• Cost limits its deployment to markets and applications that demand best-of-class availability.

• Sun has made significant investments and advancements in the Solaris operating system.
• Sun is the only vendor with a dual-platform (x86 and RISC) unified Unix strategy that addresses industry-standard scale-out and proprietary scale-up.
• Sun's work with the open-source community has increased interest in Solaris among developers.
• New product lines and operating system features have helped re-establish Sun as a technology innovator.
• Sun has established OEM channels for Solaris on other vendor platforms.

• The legacy installed base continues to be vulnerable to Linux.
• Sun is late to the game in the x86 server market; it has a lot of catch-up work to accomplish, such as building a critical mass of independent software vendors.
• Sun's relentless promotion of Solaris creates an imbalance for Sun's promotion of Windows and Linux on x86 systems.
• There is mixed messaging from Sun and Fujitsu regarding the strategic role and future for SPARC Enterprise Server technology.

• Teradata has amassed a significant and respected knowledge of the enterprise data warehousing market.
• Teradata has strong reference programs, partner programs and software vendor relationships.
• A long-standing commitment to massively parallel processing architecture enables Teradata to address the most demanding data warehousing requirements.

• Other database management system (DBMS) platform vendors are targeting Teradata's market with complementary architecture designs — for instance, Oracle Optimized Warehouse, HP Neoview and IBM's Balanced Warehouse. This is eroding Teradata's traditional scaling superiority.
• Because most prospects use DBMS products (for example, from Oracle or Microsoft SQL Server), Teradata must argue the case for an additional specialist data warehouse DBMS solution.
• The Teradata value proposition is less obvious for medium-scale and low-end data warehousing requirements.

• Unisys pioneered high-scale x86 server technology and has been able to move its mainframe operating systems onto the x86 architecture to provide new options.
• Unisys ES7000 is backed by a strong set of software, services and applications.
• Manufacturing collaboration with NEC should improve supply chain economies of scale and help Unisys penetrate new markets.

• Unisys is seen as shifting away from hardware toward services.
• Lack of a broad x86 line limits Unisys' ability to address x86 needs across the data center.
• Unisys' vertical industry and geographic specialization likely mean that other industries will get less attention across all geographies.

• Verari has a strong position in high-performance computing environments.
• Verari's technology can be an appealing alternative to mainstream blades.
• Verari has a strong track record for platforms that address power and cooling challenges.

• It is difficult for Verari to translate its appeal to mainstream data centers across all geographies.
• Verari's focus on direct current power can have a polarizing influence on potential buyers.
• Verari's design approach limits its appeal outside the data center.